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Abstract 
Purpose: This article aims to examine the reasons of strategic nature that led Varig, the 
traditional 80 year-old Brazilian flag carrier, to a decadence process, which, in 2006, put a 
doubt over the continuity of its operations. 
Design/methodology/approach:  To  accomplish  to  this  purpose  the  case  study 
investigative methodology was applied and official sources were consulted, such as annual 
reports,  previous  studies  and  electronic  documents  at  Civil  Aviation  Department.  In 
parallel, direct observation was also  used, which  was possible because at the time the 
authors were executives of GOL, which was another Brazilian airline. 
Findings: The main reasons identified were the environmental change occurred in the 
international and domestic scenarios, increasing sector competition; the peculiarities of its 
corporate governance; and the internal contradictions and its lack of capability to react to 
environmental changes. 
Originality/value: No other studies covering the decadence and the last days of Varig 
had been written before and the fulfillment of this gap may be useful to understand why 
and how apparently invulnerable traditional and prestigious airlines can perish. Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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1. Introduction 
There  are  a  great  number  of  definitions  about  the  signifying  of  the  corporate 
strategy concept. However, in the middle of such a huge diversity of approaches, 
there is a converging aspect: dealing with strategy implies, among other aspects, in 
treating  the  adjustment  between  the  organization  and  its  environment.  Certo, 
Peter,  Marcondes  and  Roux  (2005)  define strategic  administration  as  being  “the 
continuous  and  interactive  process  that  aims  to  keep  an  organization  as  a  unit 
properly integrated in its environment. Thus, disarticulation taking place between 
the  organization  and  its  environment  brings  a  strategic  disarrangement  in  its 
fundamentals.  It  brings  a  disharmony  process,  reaching  a  great  part  of  its 
functions, which, depending on its level and permanence, ends up in its complete 
collapse.  
This  case  study  is  about  a  great  organization,  with  80  years  of  existence,  with 
human  resources  that  have  a  large  experience,  with  huge  prestige  inside  and 
outside  Brazil,  and  counts  on the  sympathy  from  government  and  from  general 
public.  This  organizational  profile  of  apparent  invulnerability  was  in  radical 
discrepancy with  its pre-bankruptcy situation, lived in mid 2006. This article will 
examine the structural reasons that led Varig to this contradictory situation. 
2. Methodology 
According  to  Yin  (2003),  case  studies  are  an  adequate  methodological  strategy 
when the investigative hypotheses are related to questions like “how?” and “why?” 
and when contemporaneous events are focused. On the other hand, still per Yin, 
investigative  strategies  can  be  either  exploratory,  or  descriptive  or  explanative. 
Thus, by combining the two propositions with the specific hypotheses of this case 
study, mentioned below, one can classify the present essay as being an exploratory 
case study. 
As  for  the  method  of  collecting  evidences,  the  following  sources  were  used: 
documentation, represented by annual reports, previous studies and consultation of 
electronic documents at Civil Aviation Department; and direct observation of the Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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behavior of the protagonists of the studied events. Also three principles of collection 
of data, as suggested by Yin, were observed: use of multiple sources of evidences, 
creation of a database about the subject and establishment of an evidence chain. 
The hypotheses  accepted here  as  being the main  reasons  for Varig’s  decadence 
process are:  
  Changes taking place in the macro-economical and in the industry, bringing 
a  deep  adaptation  disarrangement  in  the  organization  in  regard  to  its 
environment 
  Peculiarities  in  the  corporate  governance  of  the  company,  making  the 
change process establish a conflict between the expectations from internal 
and external public 
  Not  overcoming  the  conflict  of  interests  between  such  publics,  in 
conjunction with the past of great achievements, that led the company to a 
situation of big strategic, tactical and operational inflexibility 
As pointed out by Drucker (1986), the economical environment is not changing, it 
has already changed. The capability to notice environmental changes movements, 
which is a sine qua non condition for the organizational change, has to be a part of 
one  company’s  competences.  Later  on,  this  capability  will  be  examined  among 
Varig’s  abilities,  when  it  was  hit,  in  the  end  of  the  90s,  by  changes  already 
happened in the end of the 70s. 
According to Kaplan and Norton (2001), the experience has shown that the most 
important isolated condition for the process of change is the active commitment of 
the executive leadership of the organization. This peculiarity, too, will be explored 
in  Varig,  taking  into  consideration  the  power  relationships  existing  in  the 
organization. 
Previous achievements are, according to Hitt et al. (2002), a source of inflexibility 
in  performing  changes  because  the  organization  tends  to  answer  to  the  new 
challenges with the same formulas that were successful in the past. Along this text, 
one  will  examine  in  which  measure  the  previous  unquestionable  successes, 
cumulated  by  Varig  during  its  history,  were  elements  that  made  difficult  the 
implementation of changes. Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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At last, it will be made explicit whether or not the balance of reaching aspirations 
from different stake-holders, so necessary for achieving the organizational stability, 
according to Hitt et al. (2002), was in Varig’s fall process. 
3. Historical facts (1927 to 1997) 
Founded on May 7, 1927, S.A. Empresa de Viação Aérea Rio-Grandense was the 
first air transport company in Brazil and one of the first in the world. Its origins go 
back to 1921, when its founder and first chairman, the German Otto Ernst Meyer, 
came to Brazil. When it was beginning its activities, the company was supported by 
Kondor Syndikat, a German airline, with its headquarters in Berlin. 
During the Second World War, while the Brazilian airlines were facing difficulties 
due to the lack of spare parts for its European airplanes,  Varig renewed its fleet 
with North American airplanes: Lockheed 10 Electra.  
In  the  year  1942  was launched  the  Porto  Alegre  –  Montevideo  line,  introducing 
Varig to the international scene. After that, with the War end and the change in the 
political panorama that was valid until then, Varig, now under command of Ruben 
Berta,  expanded  its  fleet  with  Douglas  DC-3/C-47  remaining  from  the  War.  It 
began, thus, its international expansion. 
In  the  beginning  of  the  50s,  with  the  low  price  availability  of  great  number  of 
aircraft  remaining  from  War,  the  barriers  to  the  entry  in  the  industry  were 
considerably  low.  As  a  consequence,  the  sector  now  had  a  significant 
fragmentation, and several small regional companies arose. 
Like  the  other  companies,  that  would  come  to  have  full  size  operation  in  the 
following decades, also Varig initiated an expansion process, which was strongly 
founded on the acquisition of smaller airlines. 
In 1951, Varig bought Aero-Geral and started its domestic links to the northern 
region of the Country. Until then, its operations were concentrated in the regions 
South and Southeast. The international expansion kept on with its extension of the 
Montevideo flight over to Buenos Aires and intensified itself with the new Lockheed 
Super G Constellation just arrived, that allowed the company to fly to New York. By 
the end of this decade, Varig became a pioneer in the jet flight operation in Brazil, 
with the purchase of the Sud Aviation Caravelle and Boeing 707. Scale gains due to Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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the  fleet  growth  and  to  the  new  aircraft  efficiency  gave  a  great  impulse to  the 
company’s profitability. 
Varig kept on with its growth both domestically and internationally, still based on 
the strategy of acquisition and incorporation of other companies, such as Consórcio 
Real  Aerovias  and  Panair  do  Brasil,  which  had  been  during  decades  its  main 
competitors.  With  the  purchase  of  Real  airline,  Varig  started  operating  lines  to 
almost all of Brazil and also to Miami, Caracas, Lima, Bogota, Mexico, Los Angeles 
and Tokyo. With the acquisition of the Panair’s routes, then Varig started flying to 
Europe  (Lisbon,  Madrid,  Paris,  London,  Frankfurt,  Milan  and  Rome).  The  new 
destinations would be now operated with Boeing 707 in a first moment, and after 
that, with the wide bodies (Douglas DC-10-30, A300, MD-11, Boeing 767, Boeing 
747 and, most recently, Boeing 777). 
In the 70s, Ruben Berta Foundation (2002) bought the share control of Cruzeiro, 
which came to be the first step for its complete acquisition, and that would happen 
17 years later. Still in the 70s, the Foundation creates the regional airline Rio-Sul to 
operate  in  the  recently  implemented  Sistema  Integrado  de  Transporte  Aéreo 
Regional – SITAR (Integrated System of Regional Air Transport). For one to have 
an  idea  of  magnitude  of  Varig  in  1977,  the  company  had  about  15  thousand 
employees and operated in 31 Brazilian cities and 26 abroad, being the biggest 
international network ever operated by a Latin American airline. 
The  economical  plan  called  “Cruzado”  (plan  for  macroeconomic  stability, 
implemented by the Brazilian Federal Government in 1986) marked the begin of the 
company’s crisis, when it froze the air ticket prices sold in Brazil, but did not freeze 
the operational costs, that kept on going up. The situation got worse when the ex-
President  Fernando  Collor  de  Mello  opened  to  other  Brazilian  airlines  the 
commercial  aviation  market  on  the  international  routes.  From  this  moment  on, 
Vasp  and  Transbrasil  became  competitors  to  Varig  on  these  routes.  The 
Government allowed, too, by means of bilateral agreements expansion, the entry of 
new foreigner airlines that started to fight over the international market, operating 
with lower costs and lower fares. Varig started to present systematic and growing 
losses from the year 1998 on. 
In  1996,  when  it  modernized  its  visual  trademark,  the  company  abandoned  a 
communication style that was one of the most representatives and enduring ones in 
the commercial aviation around the world. This step, more than an update to its 
brand,  marked  the  beginning  of  tentatively  readjust  the  company  to  the  new Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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competitive reality of the industry both in Brazil and in the world. By ends of 1997, 
despite of its entry in the Star Alliance – strategic cooperation alliance gathering 
other 14 great international companies, such as United Airlines, ANA – All Nippon 
Airways, Lufthansa, SAS – Scandinavian Airlines, Singapore and Thai – gets deeper 
the  process  of  financial  crisis,  bringing  its  fleet  reduction  (devolution  of  Boeing 
747s) and layover of employees. International routes were cancelled, one after the 
other, in a moment when competitors were expanding. 
Varig’s  acceptance  by  Star  Alliance  symbolized  the  recognition  by  a  part  of  the 
global industry of commercial aviation of the relevance of Varig in the international 
context,  marking  the  company’s  participation  in  a  “club”  of  high  reputation 
companies. Thus, the entry in Star Alliance marked the last strategic advancement 
by  Varig.  Since  then,  all  strategic  actions  of  the  company  would  be  of  defense 
nature, i.e., aiming only its survival. 
4. The crisis aggravation (1998 to 2005) 
In 1998, the atmosphere was optimistic at Varig, but the reality of the years to 
follow  frustrated  the  expectations.  The  exchange  rate  crisis in 1999  provoked  a 
remarkable  fall  in  demand  of  the  international  routes  and  aggravated  the 
company’s  debts  that  usually  gathered  resources  from  the  international  finance 
market. The negative impacts in its results left Varig weakened for the next years, 
while Tam would become its main competitor and Gol would start in the market, 
making competition even more difficult in the domestic market. 
In a deep finance crisis moment, in December 2002, with a cumulative loss up to 
September of R$ 2 Billion, Varig postponed the payment of the 13
th salary to its 
employees, for the first time in its history. The reason stated for that was the need 
to make daily payments to the State owned BR oil distributor, in order to maintain 
the fuel of its aircraft in Brazil. Simultaneously, in Paris, one of its aircraft was kept 
on the airport due to lack of leasing payment, which called attention of Brazilian 
Government for the severity of the company’s situation. 
The next year began with the signature of a memorandum of understanding for the 
fusion  of  Varig  with  its  main  competitor,  Tam,  that  also  lived  a  finance  crisis 
moment.  According  to  this  agreement,  sponsored  by  the  Brazilian  Government, 
both companies initiated a fusion process by making a codeshare in part of their 
domestic flights. This joint operation got to cover more than half of the flights of Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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the  companies  and  it  made  Tam  come  over  Varig  in  number  of  passengers 
transported in the domestic market. 
In that occasion, SEAE – Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico do Governo 
Federal (Federal government’s secretary for economic monitoring) recommended to 
CADE  –  Conselho Administrativo  de  Defesa Econômica  (administrative  council  of 
economic defense) the suspension of the codeshare agreement, stating damage to 
the  consumers,  given  that  the  codeshare  meant,  in  praxis,  supply  shrinkage, 
restricting the competition and bringing along the increase of fares. After months of 
codeshare  operation,  the  so  intended  fusion,  however,  would  never  come  to 
happen. 
Among the elements that inhibited Varig-Tam fusion was the fact that this process 
initiative  was  purely  governmental,  without  any  real  interest  from  any  of  the 
companies, for this being effective. Tam was afraid that Varig’s liabilities would lead 
to its inviability (due to its magnitude), while Varig awaited that a governmental 
action would rescue it from its difficult situation, without having to touch its internal 
structures. 
In 2005, Varig and Tam announced the end to their codeshare agreement, which 
made Varig cancel part of its routes, being then overcome by GOL in its domestic 
market share in April that same year. 
With the crisis aggravation, the company requested to the Brazilian Justice in order 
to  have  a  process  or  judicial  recovering,  a  mechanism  that  would  replace  the 
Chapter 11, according to the new Bankruptcy Law in Brazil. Simultaneously, Varig 
started  a  negotiation  with  Tap  (from  Portugal),  for  selling  the  company,  which 
would purchase its subsidiaries Varig Log (cargo) and VEM (aircraft maintenance). 
With the result of this sale, Varig had a relief for a moment of the pressure on its 
cash  flow.  However,  a  few  months  later,  the  pre-bankruptcy  situation  of  the 
company would come again. 
5. The environmental changes impacting Varig 
The fares freeze 
In the political and legal environment, the main change negatively impacting Varig 
was the freeze of the air fares, happened due to the edition of the national macro-
economic  stability  plans,  between  1986  and  1991.  The  credits  from  the  judicial Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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action entered by Varig against the Union of States of Brazil, trying to have back 
the losses caused by the fares freeze, together with its taxation paid to the State 
and Federal governments, recognized by the company in its finance results books 
as per research on December 31, 2005, got to the mark of R$ 7.03 Billion. On the 
other hand, in these very same books, the liabilities uncovered by the company 
reached  the  mark  of  R$  7,09  Billion,  remaining,  thus,  an  adjusted  uncovered 
liability of R$ 890 Million. 
From another point of view, Varig accumulated taxation debts of R$ 3.5 Billion up 
to  December  31,  2005.  Having  credits  and  debts  unpayable  to  the  Federal 
Government, Varig’s intention was to make a clearance of accounts, in order to 
clean up its balance sheet and allow the search for resources capable of making 
viable its operation in a short term. 
The big problem was that, even making all this cleaning action, Varig was enduring 
in  the  performance  of  high  operational  losses,  which  inhibited  any  type  of 
capitalization. 
However,  other  environmental  changes,  happened  in  the  sector  environment, 
impacted very toughly the company. The main ones are: review of the bilateral 
agreement  between  Brazil  and  USA,  since  1989,  increasing  the  number  of 
frequencies  between  both  Countries,  expanding  the  number  of  companies 
designated and establishing a bigger flexibility of fares offered in this market; and 
the freedom given by the Federal Government for the Brazilian domestic air fares 
and the facilitation of new players in the sector, which, in last analysis, made viable 
the implementation and development of GOL. 
The reviews of the bilateral agreement Brazil – United States of America 
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter bestowed the Air Deregulation Act, in the United 
States. Since then, the U.S. Government made efforts to implement the Open Skies 
Policy, i.e., liberalization of the air transport activity. 
In order to adjust to the new U.S. institutional mark, there was the need to review 
the Air Service Agreement (ASA) between Brazil and U.S., mostly in regard of the 
designation  and  capacity  questions.  The  bilateral  agreement  covered  the 
monodesignation, i.e., restricted to each Party the designation of just one company 
to  operate  between  the  two  countries.  This  enabled  only  Varig  and  Panam  to Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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explore this market for decades, the first representing the Brazilian flagship and the 
second one representing the U.S. 
In  order  to  push  the  Brazilian  Government,  the  U.S.  Government  denounced  in 
1981 the existing bilateral agreement. However, only on March 21, 1989, i.e., eight 
years later, Brazil and U.S. signed a new Air Services Agreement, now covering the 
multi-designation, increasing to three the number of companies enabled to fly on 
each country’s behalf. 
As for the capacity, i.e., number of frequencies agreed by each Party, the new Air 
Services Agreement determined that, since 1
st of April 1989, the designated airlines 
from each country would be able to operate 29 weekly frequencies on each side. 
The number of frequencies agreed would increase to 31 on April 1
st, 1990; to 34 on 
November 1
st 1990; and to 40 on April 1
st, 1991. The U.S. airlines Eastern Airlines 
and American Airlines started then services to Brazil, at the side of Panam. 
The Brazilian governmental policy for the international air transport was the one of 
the  mono-designation,  independent  upon  what  was  covered  in  the  bilateral 
agreements between other countries. In practical life, this orientation implied that 
Varig  had  a  monopole  for  the  Brazilian  part  of  the  international  markets.  This 
situation brought along an enduring and continuous pressure by the other Brazilian 
airlines, that wished to have income in strong currency, so needed in the Brazilian 
economic environment of chronic and high inflation. 
The  flexibilization  process  of  the  mono-designation  policy  of  the  airlines 
corresponded to the political opening and end of the dictatorship regime lived in 
Brazil.  Thus, the  National  Civil  Aviation  Conference  (a  non  regular  period  based 
event,  involving  the  aeronautical  authority  and  airlines  in  Brazil,  organized 
whenever there is a need to reformulate the sector policy in Brazil), held in 1986, 
started the opening process for the international routes, by allowing the operation 
of other Brazilian airlines on non regular scheduled flights to abroad. The directions 
formulated in the conclusions of this conference pointed to a future market opening 
for regularly scheduled flights, which, in fact, happened in 1991, with the entry of 
Transbrasil and Vasp in the long-haul international market. 
In  the  90s,  the  aeronautical  consultancy  meetings  between  Brazil  and  the  U.S. 
became  more  often.  Given  this,  the  capacity  was  expanded  up  to  105  weekly 
frequencies,  agreed  in  November  1997.  Moreover,  the  number  of  designated Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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companies on each side increased to 4, which made possible the entry of Tam and 
Continental Airlines, from the Brazilian and the U.S. side, respectively. 
There  are  the  ones  who  consider  that  the  Brazilian  Government  would  have 
expanded too much this bilateral agreement with the U.S. and would have allowed 
the entry of too many competitors on these routes that were, until then, reserved 
to Varig and to the designated company from the U.S. In fact, the impact of these 
measures was huge and contributed to the disarticulation of Varig. Nevertheless, 
according to Brigadier Carlos Sérgio de Sant’anna César, who was the president of 
the  Consultancy  Meeting Brazil  –  United  States  in 1991,  the  estimates  of  traffic 
increment  made  at  that  time  indicated  an  exponential  growth  of  demand.  The 
forecasts  considered  data  of  passengers  transported  from  1989  through  1995, 
period in which the traffic had grown 225%. 
Based  on  this  expectation  of  demand  growth,  the  Brazilian  airlines  requested, 
according to Brigadier César, a number “corresponding to 149 weekly frequencies, 
being, thus, conservative the position of the Brazilian government when it agreed 
upon only 105 weekly frequencies”. However, the traffic between Brazil and the 
U.S. from 1998 through 2004 kept practically the same. 
Before  the  significant  reversion  of  the  previous  expectation,  the  conservative 
positions  of  the  bilateral  agreement  Brazil  –  United  States  became  inoffensive, 
building barriers to the entry and leading, in praxis, the specific market to the free 
competition model. In other words, the political changes had set Varig, in its main 
international market, in a very hostile environment. 
Flexibilization of domestic air fares in Brazil 
The begin of flexibilization process of the domestic air fares in Brazil occurred in 
1992  by  means  of  publishing  the  Regulatory  Order  (portaria)  nº  075/GM5,  of 
February  6  of  that  year,  after  complemented  by  the  Orders  nº  1632/DGAC  of 
December 9, 2003 and nº 1282 of December 2004, following the world trend that 
one could see in the sector. This trend began in the U.S. by means of the edition of 
the Air Deregulation Act, mentioned before. In Western Europe, the deregulation 
occurred  in  a  slower  process,  between 1987 and  1997,  by  means  of  three  acts 
edited by the Council of Europe Regulations. 
These  legal  diplomas  fixed  criteria  of  determination  of  fares  and  limits  both 
maximum and minimum for these amounts. These limits were created based on the Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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curve of costs (distance versus unit operational costs) of the main equipment used 
in the operation of the domestic flights of that time, Boeing 737/300. The intention 
was to introduce a certain grade of competition based on the sector’s fare, avoiding 
from extreme situations, not only in regard of the exaggerated high fares, but also 
in  regard  of  the  too  low  fares  that  could  possibly  bring  a  risk  to  the  sector 
profitability. 
The dynamic competition and the unit costs relatively close to each other among 
the competitors ended up making the maximum and minimum limits very difficult 
to reach, at least up to the moment when GOL launched.  
Thus,  since  2001,  supported  by  unit  costs  that  were  inferior  to  the  industry 
average, between 25% and 30%, and by using exhaustively the yield management 
techniques, GOL  started coming down frequently to the minimum allowed prices 
established  and,  in  many  cases,  under  special  approvals,  even  lower  than  the 
minimum. 
Differently from what the traditional competitors were expecting, GOL’s marketing 
mix, supported on the binomial low cost – low fare, had an enormous acceptance 
by the public, obliging the industry, as a whole, to reduce significantly their average 
prices. The more GOL grew, the more the competition to Varig grew and, in a few 
months,  there  was  no  relevant  market  whose  prices  had  not  been  significantly 
reduced. 
On the international field, the trend of fares liberalization was getting intense and 
the general practice was that of the complete freedom, when the trade of travel 
occurred in foreigner countries. On the other hand, the trade of international travel 
within Brazil obeyed to very restrictive values and fare rules, established based on 
IATA’s criteria  (International Air  Transport Association). Even if  so,  the Brazilian 
governmental inspection inhibiting the prices lower than the minimum established 
was left behind by means of disguised discounts, given by the airlines to the travel 
agents, sales channels highly predominant in the sector. 
In  a  few  words,  in  the  praxis  there  were  just  a  little  effective  mechanisms  of 
governmental control related to the sales of air tickets at low prices. However, the 
support from the Brazilian Aeronautical Authority to forum, such as to JURCAIB – 
Junta das Companhias Aéreas Internacionais no Brasil (joint of international airlines 
in Brazil), created mechanisms of self control in the industry. Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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In  regard  to  the  air  cargo,  not  only  domestic  but  also  international,  free 
competition of prices was practically total. The fundamental reason is that, even if 
there  was  an  index  table  of  fares  published  by  the  Brazilian  Government,  the 
diversity of nature and variation of cargos, for which there are specific and different 
fares, it becomes virtually impossible to implement any type of price control. 
In summary, the deep environmental changes felt in a more intense way by Varig 
since 1998, in fact have their origins 20 years earlier, without any change process 
taking place within the company, as one can see ahead. 
Probably,  the  period  of  time  past  between  the  environmental  change  and  the 
manifest of its effects was so long due to the solid institutional machine built in the 
symbiotic relationship between Varig and the Federal Government. 
6. Peculiarities in Varig’s corporate governance 
The share composition of Varig is sui generis, once its absolute control is kept by a 
philanthropic  entity  named  Ruben  Berta  Foundation,  although  it  has  its  shares 
commercialized in stock exchanges.  
Before 1996, Varig’s share control was held by an employees’ foundation of the 
company,  which  changed  its  name  to  Ruben  Berta  Foundation,  in  honor  of  its 
former chairman. 
The mission statement of the entity brings this: “To promote the well-being of its 
employees by taking actions oriented to quality of life, constituting a motivational 
and commitment element together with the Entity and the company for which they 
work”.  This  mission  (sic)  is  explicit  in  the  first  article  of  the  Statute  of  the 
Foundation, which constitutes its stone clause: “… is meant to ensure well-being of 
Varig’s employees and its dependants, according to the merit and years of work of 
those ones…”. This first paragraph of the Statute includes among the beneficiaries 
also  the  permanents  of  the  Foundation  itself  and  the  fourth  paragraph  includes 
retired and children under 18. 
As one can deduct, since its creation, Ruben Berta Foundation was imagined as an 
Entity with the prime purpose of benefiting its members, not including any other 
stakeholder  in  its  explicit  preoccupations,  not  even  in  its  corporate  rhetoric. 
Moreover,  this  is  about  a  fundamental  and  confirmed  position  and  along  its 
existence. Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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The Foundation Social Statute (sic) established the creation of a Council (highest 
instance),  made  of  employees  with  more  than  10  years  in  that  company. 
Currently there are 220 members (authors’ remark). They would be responsible 
for the decisions that would guide the future of this institution. 
Thus, besides an institution concerned about itself, the foundation is led by a kind 
of  internal  aristocracy,  whose  premise  of  participation  is  seniority  in  the 
organization. 
As  one  can  observe,  the  values  and  postulates  of  the  Ruben  Berta  Foundation 
constitute  completely  unusual  characteristics in  modern  organizations  as  well  as 
unlinked  to  the  external  environment  demands.  In  other  words,  the  entity’s 
fundamental  characteristics  confront  explicitly  against  the  strategic  approach 
previously enunciated.  
In this context, it is easy to imagine in which measure the internal leaderships of 
the organization were much more committed with the objectives of these groups 
than to its alignment with external demands of change. 
7. The  internal  contradictions  and  the  incapability  to  react  to 
environmental changes 
Paradoxically,  Varig’s  corporate  speech  was  to  associate,  domestically,  its  own 
interest  with  the  sector’s  interest  and,  internationally  its  own  interest  with  the 
Brazilian Government’s interest. It is easy to evaluate how this rhetoric was always 
well accepted by Brazilian Authorities, responsible for the governmental policies for 
a controlled industry, exploring a public service (as it has always been defined in 
Brazilian  constitutions),  linked  to  a  military  Ministry,  with  many  years  under 
dictatorial governments. Shamefully, in the industry slang, one uses to say that 
“Brazilian team (of soccer) is the Homeland in soccer shoes whereas Varig is the 
Homeland on wings. 
It is surprising that this contradiction – mission oriented to internal interest and 
rhetoric  oriented  to  national  interest  –  never  has  been  explored  by  dissociated 
interests from the ones of Varig. 
On the other hand, the remarkable adjustment between corporate rhetoric and the 
political-military ideology along several years constituted essential competence in 
the  organization,  responsible  for  most  of  Varig’s  successful  achievements,  even Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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because  international  commercial  aviation  is  ruled  by  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements among the countries. 
Although this speech has been losing strength since civil democratic governments 
took over Brazil, getting to the point of passing by indifference, according to this 
text’s epigraph, it has been reinforced by the enormous corporate success of Varig. 
As Hitt et al. (2002) emphasizes, organizational inflexibilities can originate from old 
strategic competences that became obsolete. 
This  case’s  authors’  personal  examination  of  the  repetitive  demonstrations  of 
Varig’s important employees, in the sense that the Brazilian Government would not 
allow  this  company  to  go  bankruptcy,  added  to  the  success  lived  by  the 
organization during years, show that the organizational inflexibilities mentioned by 
Hitt et al. (2002) are, in fact, one of the fundamental causes of Varig’s decadence. 
One can say so, because while the competitor Tam, in the beginning of 2000s, was 
modernizing its commercial systems, reducing costs, changing its price tactics in 
order to face the new competitive environment, Varig kept itself stuck before the 
aggravation of its difficulties, waiting for the redemption to come from its traditional 
ally, the Federal Government. 
In regard of the adjustment of its operations to a more competitive environment, 
arising  from  a  smaller  governmental  intervention  in  the  sector,  Varig  took  no 
important  structural  action  to  adjust  its  operational  costs  to  the  new  demands. 
Evidently, this lack of action is related to its genuine organization’s commitment in 
defending  inflexibly  its  employees’  interests,  which  almost  invariably  are 
contradicted in the downsizing and downscoping processes. This is not about the 
layovers inherent to those processes, but also the more demanding work practices, 
such as more monthly working hours of the crew, just to mention one example. 
8. Conclusion 
As showed, the  environmental  changes  occurred  in the  air transport  industry,  a 
process  that  began  in  1978,  in  the  U.S.,  transformed  structurally  the  sector, 
determining  that  the  airlines  reduced  its  costs  and  started  having  more 
competitiveness,  as  a  sine  qua  non  condition  for  their  survival.  These  changes 
impacted  directly  Varig,  a  company  led  by  an  aristocracy  of  employees  and 
committed  with  the  internal  needs  and,  therefore,  disarticulated  in  the  external 
environment demands. Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 51-66 
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It became also clear that Varig’s survival would be possible if the organization had 
implemented changes processes, such as other airlines did in Brazil and around the 
world. 
It  was  pointed,  too,  that  performing  essential  adjustments to  the  organization’s 
survival  would  collide  with  Varig’s  employees’  interests,  generating  an 
unovercomable contradiction. 
In this environment, the belief flourished that the redemption would come from 
outside,  from  the  Brazilian  State,  in  a  kind  of  corporate  sebastianism,  in  which 
everything would change for better without that anyone would have to touch any 
sensitive point of the employees’ interest. 
On the other hand, the organization’s expressive successful achievements, reached 
in a not so far away past, reinforced the company leaders’ conviction that their 
organizational model was the most efficient, even being denied as a belief by the 
external environment. 
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